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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Cullen D. Seltzer*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses recent Virginia cases and legislative
developments in the area of criminal law and procedure. The
article discusses cases from April of 1995 to July of 1996 and
legislative changes effective July 1, 1996. This article does not
discuss federal developments. Nor does the article discuss death
penalty issues, as that area of the law is sufficiently particular-
ized that, for purposes of manageability, it falls outside the
scope of this discussion.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
* Assistant Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia. BA, 1990, Mary Washington
College; J.D., 1993, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. The author
wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Office of the Public Defender
for the City of Richmond which provided the research resources from which the ma-
jority of this article draws, as well as an environment which encourages thoughtful
consideration and debate of the law. In particular, the author is grateful to the con-
tributions of Susan Hansen, Deputy Public Defender for the City of Richmond; Pa-
tricia Nagel, Assistant Public Defender for the City of Richmond; and Maureen White,
who each assisted in preparing timely summaries of recent cases and legislative de-
velopments. Of course, I am always grateful to my wife Rosemary G. Seltzer who,
improbably and inexplicably, continues to put up with me.
1. The sections denoted by reference to one of the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution are, of course, simply a shorthand means of describing
what component of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is at issue. This
is necessarily so because the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution
do not apply to the States; rather, many of the protections afforded by those
amendments have been incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which does expressly apply to the States. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to
be tried in a feceral court-would come within the Sixth Amendments guarantee.")
(emphasis added); JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ET AL., CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE AND THE
CONSTITuTION 33-34 (1993) ("The first eight amendments were enacted as limitations
solely upon the federal government."). The modem trend in incorporation theory is
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A. Probable Cause
Relying in part on the notion that a magistrate's determina-
tion of probable cause is, on appeal, entitled to great deference,
the Virginia Court of Appeals in Cherry v. Commonwealth
2
affirmed the search of a home pursuant to a search warrant. In
Cherry, police obtained a warrant to search a UPS package that
a drug dog indicated contained marijuana.3 On opening the
package, the police found that it did indeed contain marijuana.
The package was then resealed. After obtaining a second war-
rant to search the address where the package was sent, under-
cover police officers delivered the package. The second anticipa-
tory warrant authorized search of the address for marijuana
and provided that "UPON DELIVERY OF SAID PACKAGE,
EXECUTION OF THIS SEARCH WARRANT IS GRANTED."'
After recovering the unopened package from the home, police
then searched the remainder of the house and found other
incriminating evidence.5 The court of appeals held that the
language "said package" did not limit the scope of the autho-
rized search, but only limited the time at which the search
could begin.' The court of appeals further held that the large
amount of marijuana found in the package gave rise to proba-
ble cause to search the entire home since the magistrate could
have inferred that such a large amount of contraband would
only be sent to a place of significant drug trafficking.7
An anonymous tipster's report that a black male in a camou-
flage jacket was selling drugs at a particular location was, in
that of "selective incorporation" whereby rights deemed to be "fundamental" are
"incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states to the same
extent that [they] appl[y] to the federal government." Id. at 43.
2. 21 Va. App. 132, 462 S.E.2d 574 (1995).
3. See id. at 135, 462 S.E.2d at 575.
4. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 576.
5. Id. at 136, 462 S.E.2d at 576.
6. Id. at 138, 462 S.E.2d at 577.
7. 1d, 462 S.E.2d at 577. In Commonwealth v. Wotherspoon, 36 Va. Cir. 112
(Fairfax County 1995), the circuit court held that the knock and announce rule is
inapplicable where police employ a ruse to accomplish a "peaceful and reasonable"
entry into a home in order to execute a search warrant and announce their presence
and identification before entering.
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Farmer v. Commonwealth,8 confirmed by police inasmuch as
they saw a person resembling the person described by the tip-
ster at the location described by the tipster.9 The police also
observed the person behave in a manner consistent with that
exhibited by drug dealers the police had previously seen."
When the suspect saw the police and began to flee, police had
reasonable suspicion to believe him to be engaging in illegal
conduct, and pursued him." When the person's flight "took on
a desperate air," police had probable cause to search and arrest
him, and it was not "particularly important that the search
preceded the arrest rather than vice versa."'
In Janis v. Commonwealth,' the court of appeals had occa-
sion to explore the parameters of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, which rule requires exclusion at trial of
evidence seized during a search unaccompanied by a valid war-
rant. In Janis, the affidavit in support of a search warrant,
"while not a 'bare bones' affidavit, failed to provide a 'nexus'"
between the evidence giving rise to probable cause and the
place to be searched.'4 Moreover, the officer's good faith reli-
ance on the warrant obtained by way of the defective affidavit
did not save the search.' The court of appeals held that "the
warrant was based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause" as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable.'" 6 Nor did the fact that the afflant was aware
of facts he did not include in the affidavit save the search,
since the court of appeals was obliged to look to the "warrant
8. 21 Va. App. 111, 462 S.E.2d 564 (1995).
9. Id. at 113, 462 S.E.2d at 565.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 115, 462 S.E.2d at 566.
12. I& at 115-16, 462 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
111 (1980)). In James v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 740, 473 S.E.2d 90 (1996), the
court of appeals affirmed a conviction stemming from a pat-down search of a passen-
ger of an automobile which had been driven by a person for whom there existed a
valid arrest warrant. The court of appeals reasoned that the defendant's pattern of
'jittery" behavior was sufficient to give rise to a permissible pat-down of the defen-
dant. Id. at 745-46, 473 S.E.2d at 92.
13. 22 Va. App. 646, 472 S.E.2d 649 (1996).
14. Id. at 652, 472 S.E.2d at 653.
15. Id. at 653, 472 S.E.2d at 653.
16. Id (citations and emphasis omitted).
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and affidavit on their face" to determine whether probable
cause existed."
The police must wait more than two or three seconds after
knocking at a dwelling before forcing their entry in order to
execute a search warrant." Moreover, a "no-knock" entry is
not warranted where the only exigency in favor of such an
entry is "the readily disposable nature of the contraband which
is the object of the search.""
In Thomas v. Commonwealth, ° the court of appeals con-
firmed that the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing
that a roadblock is '"safe and objective in its operation, em-
ploy[s] neutral criteria, and [does] not [permit] standardless
unbridled discretion by the police officer in the field.'"2 More-
over, when a vehicle stops within thirty yards of a roadblock
and the roadblock is visible from the location where the vehicle
has stopped, and when the "only direction of travel available to
the vehicle was to the roadblock," the vehicle has stopped with-
in the "roadblock's zone."22
17. Id. at 655, 472 S.E.2d at 654 (citation and emphasis omitted). The court of
appeals reasoned:
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the Leon
[good faith] exception does not extend "to allow the consideration of facts
known only to an officer and not presented to a magistrate. The Leon
test for good faith reliance is clearly an objective one and it is based
solely on facts presented to the magistrate."
When the officers have not presented a colorable showing, and the
warrant and affidavit on their face preclude reasonable reliance, the
reasoning of Leon does not apply. To permit the total deficiency of the
warrant and affidavit to be remedied by subsequent testimony concerning
the subjective knowledge of the officer who sought the warrant would, we
believe, unduly erode the protections of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 654-55, 472 S.E.2d at 653-54 (citation and emphasis omitted).
18. Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 320, 322, 464 S.E.2d 176, 177
(1995).
19. Id. at 326, 464 S.E.2d at 179.
20. 22 Va. App. 735, 473 S.E.2d 87 (1996).
21. Id. at 739, 473 S.E.2d at 89 (quoting Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va.
200, 203, 380 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1989)).
22. Id.
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B. Reasonably Articulable Suspicion of Crime-The Terry'
Stop
In Buck v. Commonwealth,' police officers in a high drug
area saw the defendant standing on a corner, and then get into
a car as a passenger and ride around the block. Three or four
minutes later, the defendant was let out of the car a block from
his original location. According to the police officers, that behav-
ior was consistent with a pattern of drug dealing. When the
police approached Buck, he made a motion to his mouth and
began to flee. That conduct in the aggregate gave the police a
reasonable suspicion of Buck's drug dealing which justified his
detention.' The court of appeals also held that the police
officers' observation of Buck making a chewing motion after he
was seized gave rise to probable cause to force Buck's mouth
open to seize what police could reasonably believe to be
drugs.26
Similarly, in Williams v. Commonwealth,' police who had
information that the defendant bought a round-trip airline
ticket from Newport News to New York and who observed the
defendant flee on being approached by the police after his
return to Newport News, had reasonable suspicion to believe
possible criminal activity was afoot.' Flight, though not
evidence in and of itself of criminal activity, "'may otherwise
color apparently innocent conduct and, under appropriate
circumstances, give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.m2
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. 20 Va. App. 298, 456 S.E.2d 534 (1995).
25. Id. at 303, 456 S.E.2d at 536.
26. Id. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 536-37. Note that the dissent agreed that the offi-
cers in this case "may have had the authority" to detain Buck, but that they did not
have probable cause to force his mouth open since a chewing motion is consistent
with lawful conduct, and his flight "while displaying a fear of or alienation from the
police, did not indicate that he possessed cocaine or other drugs." Id- at 305, 456
S.E.2d at 537.
27. 21 Va. App. 263, 463 S.E.2d 679 (1995).
28. Id. at 265-67, 463 S.E.2d at 680-81.
29. Id at 266-67, 463 S.E.2d at 680-81 (quoting Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.
App. 298, 303, 456 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1995)).
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In Freeman v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals held
that a police officer could rely on his twenty-one years of expe-
rience in reasonably suspecting that a defendant who drove ten
to fifteen miles per hour below the speed limit in a fifty-five
mile per hour zone, and who weaved, over a two mile distance,
three or four times in his own lane, was intoxicated."'
The court of appeals held in a series of cases that anonymous
tipsters may, under certain circumstances, give rise to reason-
able suspicion of crime. In O'Toole v. Commonwealth,32 the
court of appeals affirmed a conviction which rested on a reli-
able, confidential informant's report of what an unknown person
reported to the known informant.33 The known confidential
informant had previously given reliable information which had
been based in part on what third parties told the known
informant.' In O'Toole, police were able to confirm the
informant's report that a particular truck would be in a partic-
ular area at a particular time and that a particular person was,
as predicted by the informant, in the truck prior to police stop-
ping the truck from which stop contraband was ultimately dis-
covered. The court of appeals held that that degree of corrobo-
ration gave rise to reasonable suspicion to lawfully effect a stop
of the vehicle.35
In Gregory v. Commonwealth,36 an anonymous tipster report-
ed that a person wearing particular clothing near a particular
car and at a particular location was dealing drugs. Police were
able to confirm that the defendant resembled the person report-
ed and was at the location and near the car reported, but did
not see any evidence of contraband or other illegal activity. 7 A
police officer then approached the defendant and said "good
30. 20 Va. App. 658, 460 S.E.2d 261 (1995).
31. Id. at 661-62, 460 S.E.2d at 263; cf. Hall v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 226,
468 S.E.2d 693 (1996) (holding that a police officer who had reason to believe the de-
fendant was armed, because he saw what he believed to be a pistol near the defen-
dant, did not have reason to believe the defendant was armed once he discovered the
pistol was in fact a toy).
32. 20 Va. App. 540, 458 S.E.2d 595 (1995), affd en reh'g, 22 Va. App. 1, 467
S.E.2d 819 (1996) (en banc).
33. Id. at 542, 458 S.E.2d at 596.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 544, 458 S.E.2d at 597.
36. 22 Va. App. 100, 468 S.E.2d 117 (1996).
37. Id. at 104, 468 S.E.2d at 119.
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morning," to which the defendant responded "What?" as the
defendant walked away. The officer, who was in his patrol car,
then observed that the defendant's hand was closed and the
officer then seized the defendant. The court of appeals held that
the defendant's post-encounter conduct with the police was
sufficiently suspicious when considered in combination with the
anonymous tipster's report to justify a temporary detention.38
The dissent observed that the officer had detected no evidence
of illegal activity and that the defendant's refusal to communi-
cate with the police was his right and gave rise to no additional
suspicion. 9
In Scott v. Commonwealth,' the court of appeals lowered
the threshold for permissible anonymous tipster-based stops
where some imminent danger might justify the detention. In
Scott, police received an anonymous tip that a black man wear-
ing a white t-shirt and black shorts was brandishing a firearm
at a laundromat. When police arrived a minute later, the defen-
dant, wearing the described clothing, was seen leaving the
laundromat. Police then stopped the defendant. The court of
appeals held that the officer's confirmation of the defendant's
clothing and location rendered the tip sufficiently reliable, in
the context of the "imminent danger" reported by the tipster, to
permit an investigative detention.41
In Commonwealth v. Spencer,42 the court of appeals remind-
ed lawyers that when gauging the reasonableness of a traffic
stop, it pays to closely scrutinize the nature of the offense
arousing police suspicion. In Spencer, police officers stopped a
car in the City of Richmond for failure to display a city proper-
ty tax decal required by the City of Richmond. The record
established, however, that other cities and counties in the Com-
monwealth did not require such decals.' Since police did not
establish that the vehicle they stopped was registered in a
political subdivision requiring property tax decals, the police did
38. Id at 110, 468 S.E.2d at 123.
39. Id at 114-15, 468 S.E.2d at 124-25 (Benton, J., dissenting).
40. 20 Va. App. 725, 460 S.E.2d 610 (1995).
41. Id- at 729.30, 460 S.E.2d at 613.
42. 21 Va. App. 156, 462 S.E.2d 899 (1995).
43. Id. at 159-60, 462 S.E.2d at 901.
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not have a reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven
in violation of the decal statute."
C. Seizure
A trial judge may permissibly conclude that a person was
seized when one of four undercover police officers exits an un-
marked car, walks briskly toward the person, and follows the
person onto the porch of a house he is attempting to enter but
cannot on account of the door being locked, and then demands
of the defendant, "What's in your hand pal?"' Although in
plain clothes, the police officer wore, in plain view, his police
identification on a chain around his neck and his sidearm on
his hip. The question of the defendant's seizure arose in an
unusual procedural context in that the trial judge first found
the defendant to be seized, which finding was reversed on in-
terlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth.' On remand, the
trial judge adhered to his initial finding of seizure but held that
he was bound by the prior ruling of the court of appeals.'
When the defendant then appealed the denial of his suppres-
sion motion, based on his unlawful seizure, the court of appeals
again reversed the trial judge and held that his finding of sei-
zure was a permissible one.' Central to the court of appeals'
final holding was the deference it paid to the trial judge's fact
finding ability and his "advantage... of seeing [the police offi-
cer] in person, of observing his demeanor, and of assessing his
inflection as he described his conduct and questions."4
A police officer who approaches a person without a show of
force and simply to check on the person's health need have no
suspicion at all; but taking that person's license to run a re-
cords check is a seizure of the person since no reasonable per-
son would believe he could leave without his license, particular-
ly if he were driving.'
44. I&
45. Satchell v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 641, 644, 460 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1995)
(en banc).
46. Id. at 644-45, 460 S.E.2d at 254-55.
47. Id. at 646, 460 S.E.2d at 255.
48. Id. at 649, 460 S.E.2d at 257.
49. Id.
50. Richmond v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 257, 468 S.E.2d 708 (1996); cf.
Commonwealth v. Smithers, 36 Va. Cir. 132 (Richmond 1995) (denying a motion to
1288
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D. Scope of the Exclusionary Rule
In Anderson v. Commonwealth,5' a defendant found himself
in the happy position of having 'the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure suppressed from evidence in his trial for possession
of cocaine. His happiness turned to dismay, however, on learn-
ing that the previously excluded evidence would be used against
him during a proceeding to revoke the suspension of a previous-
ly suspended sentence for a prior, unrelated charge.52 On the
basis of the illegally obtained evidence, Anderson's previously
suspended sentence of twenty years in the penitentiary was
revoked.'
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
fused to find error in the trial court's admission of the evidence.
The appellate courts reasoned that the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule, to "deter future unlawful police conduct,"'
did not have much force in a probation or suspended sentence
revocation proceeding because no evidence in Anderson's case
suggested the unlawful search by the police was in bad faith."
The court of appeals, in Johnson v. Commonwealth," extended
the rationale of Anderson to probation revocation proceedings."7
suppress evidence discovered when police demanded of a car's driver his operator's
license even though the person suspected of criminal activity was the car's passen-
ger).
51. 20 Va. App. 361, 457 S.E.2d 396 (1995), affd, 251 Va. 437, 470 S.E.2d 862
(1996).
52. Id. at 363, 457 S.E.2d at 397.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 364, 457 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976)).
55. Id. at 365, 457 S.E.2d at 398.
56. 21 Va. App. 172, 462 S.E.2d 907 (1995).
57. Judge Benton's dissent in Johnson applies with equal force to Anderson and
bears repeating in significant part here:
By failing to apply the exclusionary rule, this Court adopts a policy
that denigrates judicial and governmental integrity. A court proceeding
which results in a denial of liberty from "evidence secured through . . . a
flagrant disregard of the procedure [devised to protect constitutional
rights] ... cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts them-
selves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." The Court overlooks the
police officer's violation of the constitution simply because the officer
testified that Johnson was unknown to him when he stopped Johnson.
"If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1281
III. FIFTH AVENDMENT
In Novak v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals consid-
ered whether a juvenile was in custody, thereby triggering the
requirement that he be read the warnings contemplated by
Miranda v. Arizona.59 The court of appeals concluded that be-
cause the defendant was accompanied by his mother, voluntari-
ly came to police headquarters on two separate occasions, and
had previously been advised that he was not a suspect in the
murder being investigated, his third voluntary visit to police
headquarters did not constitute custodial interrogation.0 The
majority acknowledged that the police persuaded Novak's moth-
er to leave during the interrogation of Novak, but concluded
that that fact was insufficient to render the interrogation a
custodial one.6 The dissenting opinion reasoned that Novak's
youthfulness, that the interrogation took place in a small closed
room at police headquarters, that Novak's mother asked to be
present and was asked by police to leave, that the interrogating
detective lied to Novak, and that when Novak's mother left the
room the interrogating detective moved his chair closer to
Novak and between Novak and the door, all combined to render
the interrogation a custodial one.62
In Midkiff v. Commonwealth,63 the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia approved the admissibility of the defendant's statement to
police, while in custody, over Midkiffs challenge that the state-
ment was taken in violation of his right to remain silent."
During the course of Midkiffs interrogation he stated, "I'll be
honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without talking to
a lawyer," and "I don't got to answer that, Dick [the first name
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Id. at 178-79, 462 S.E.2d at 911 (Benton, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
58. 20 Va. App. 373, 457 S.E.2d 402 (1995).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. Novak, 20 Va. App. at 385-86, 457 S.E.2d at 408.
61. Id. at 386-87, 457 S.E.2d at 408-09.
62. Id. at 399, 457 S.E.2d at 414 (Benton, J., dissenting).
63. 250 Va. 262, 462 S.E.2d 112 (1995).
64. Id. at 264, 462 S.E.2d 112, 113-14. Midkiff challenged the admissibility of his
statement under the broad rubric of the Miranda doctrine which contemplates both
Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees. Midldffs Sixth Amendment challenge is dis-
cussed infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
1290
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of an interrogator], you know."65 The Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia initially acknowledged that Miranda66 requires that if a sus-
pect "indicates in any'manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease."" The supreme court went on to say, however,
that "Miranda should not be read so strictly as to require the
police to accept as conclusive any statement, no matter how
ambiguous, as a sign that the suspect desires to cut off ques-
tioning.'"68 The supreme court held that Mfidkiffs statement,
"I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without
talking to a lawyer... [b]ecause I, I got hoodooed big time
back in, when- I was in, now, don't get me wrong. .. ," was a
mere expression of reservations about answering questions, but
not an invocation of his right to remain silent.69 The supreme
court similarly held that Midkiffs statement, "I don't got to an-
swer that, Dick, you know," was "simply an afirmation that
Midkiff understood his right to remain silent."" The supreme
court did not explain why, contextually, it would make sense
for Midkiff to elect, when he did, to explain to the police his
depth of understanding.7
In 1994, the court of appeals held in Husske v. Common-
wealth,72 a panel opinion, that inculpatory statements made by
65. Id. at 265, 462 S.E.2d at 114.
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
67. Midkiff, 250 Va. at 267, 462 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
473-74).
68. Id. (quoting Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 312, 227 S.E.2d 737, 741
(1976)).
69. Id. (alteration in original). Following Midkiffs statement, "... now, don't
get me wrong... " the opinion quotation recites that "(recorder is turned off)." Id.
at 265, 462 S.E.2d at 114. Why the recorder should be stopped or malfunction at
such an apparently crucial moment is unexplained by the opinion.
70. Id. at 268, 462 S.E.2d at 116.
71. In Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 136, 468 S.E.2d 135 (1996), a de-
fendant filling out a rights waiver form answered "no" to the printed statement say-
ing he desired to waive his rights and make a statement. Id. at 140, 468 S.E.2d at
136-37. The interrogating officer asked, "[Y]ou do not want to talk to me, Mr.
Riddick?" to which the defendant responded that he misunderstood the form and that
he did want to talk to the police. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 137. The court of appeals held
that the officer's question, "Mou do not want to talk to me, Mr. Riddick," was "un-
likely to elicit an 'incriminating response?" and therefore was not an unlawful resump-
tion of interrogation. Id. at 145-46, 468 S.E.2d at 140.
72. 19 Va. App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331 (1994), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g,
21 Va. App. 91, 462 S.E.2d 120 (1995).
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a defendant as part of court-ordered counseling could not be
used against the defendant in a subsequent criminal matter.73
Husske had been required to participate in sex-offender coun-
seling as a condition of his suspended sentence. 4 On en banc
review of the panel decision, however, an equally divided court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court admitting the state-
ments.75 No opinion explaining the divisions in the court of
appeals accompanied the order affirming the admission of the
statements. In September of 1996, however, the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the trial court's holding.76 The supreme
court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is not, in circumstances such as Husske's, self-
executing, and that a defendant who "'desires the protection of
the privilege [against self incrimination], ... must claim it or
[he] will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the
meaning of the Amendment."' The supreme court then ob-
served that since "no one required Husske 'to choose between
making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his condi-
tional liberty by remaining silent,'" no Fifth Amendment viola-
tion stemmed from admitting Husske's statements made to his
counselor in court-ordered treatment.75
In light of the supreme court's holding, the defense bar would
do well to exercise caution in referring clients to pre- and post-
trial treatment programs as a condition of suspended sentences
or bail, and in advising clients on how to cooperate with proba-
tion officers involved in preparing pre-sentence reports and in
supervising probation or parole. Such caution may disadvantage
clients who have needs that these sorts of programs can ad-
dress, and negatively affect their sentencing proceedings. Never-
theless, these risks need to be weighed against the potential for
damaging self-incrimination problems in the future. Prosecutors,
73. Id. at 54, 448 S.E.2d at 344.
74. Id. at 47, 448 S.E.2d at 341.
75. Husske v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 91, 462 S.E.2d 120 (1995).
76. Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 (1996).
77. Id. at 214, 476 S.E.2d at 927 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
427 (1984)).
78. Id. at 217, 476 S.E.2d at 928-29. The court of appeals panel majority, in
coming to a contrary holding, relied in part on the testimony from Husske's counselor
that Husske's failure to be fully forthcoming and participatory in his counseling
would result in a violation of the conditions of his suspended sentence. See Husske,
19 Va. App. at 52, 448 S.E.2d at 343-44.
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by the same token, may no doubt profit from the disclosures
made by certain defendants as part of court-ordered counseling.
IV. SITH AMENDMENT
A defendant may waive his right to appear at his trial if his
absence is occasioned by his own flight in the middle of trial.79
Such flight by the defendant constituted a "knowing and volun-
tary waiver" of his right to be present at trial, and his flight
should not be permitted to disrupt the "proper administration of
criminal justice."0
Midkiff v. Commonwealth,81 discussed above in the section
on the Fifth Amendment, also discussed the right to counsel
dimension of the Miranda protections. The Supreme Court of
Virginia began with the premise that only a "clear and unam-
biguous assertion of the right to counsel" necessarily triggers an
immediate cessation of questioning. 2 The supreme court then
observed that, in its prior decisions, "Do you think I need an
attorney here?"' "You did say I could have an attorney if I
wanted one?"' and "Didn't you say I have the right to an at-
torney?"8 all "fell short of being clear assertions of the right to
counsel." 6 The supreme court concluded that Midkifi's state-
ment, "I'm scared to say anything without talking to a lawyer,'
expresse[d] his reservation about the wisdom of continuing the
interrogation without consulting a lawyer [but did] not clearly
and unambiguously communicate a desire to invoke his right to
counsel."87 The supreme court also found Davis v. United
States' to stand for the proposition that "'Maybe I should talk
79. Barfield v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 447, 457 S.E.2d 786 (1995).
80. Id. at 451, 457 S.E.2d at 788.
81. 250 Va. 262, 462 S.E.2d 112 (1995).
82. Id. at 266, 462 S.E.2d at 115.
83. Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 396, 422 S.E.2d 380, 387 (1992).
84. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 250, 397 S.E.2d 385, 393 (1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991).
85. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 410, 329 S.E.2d 815, 823, cert. denied,
474 U.S. 865 (1985).
86. Midkiff, 250 Va. at 266, 462 S.E.2d at 115.
87. Id. at 267, 462 S.E.2d at 115.
88. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). The Davis ma-
jority held that in the absence of a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to
counsel, questioning may continue. Id. at _ 114 S. Ct. at 2357. The officers in Davis
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to a lawyer,' was not an invocation of the right to counsel and,
therefore, subsequent statements by the accused did not need to
be suppressed."89
In Griswold v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia struck out to set a bright line test for determining the
admissibility of prior uncounseled (i.e., actually uncounseled or
unaccompanied by a waiver of the right to counsel) convictions
in subsequent proceedings. Simply put, the absence of counsel,
or a waiver thereof, renders a conviction "constitutionally in-
firm" if the conviction resulted in actual incarceration.9 Such
a conviction may not be used as the predicate of a future of-
fense at the guilt or innocence stage,92 or to enhance punish-
ment as part of a record of convictions at a sentencing phase."
An uncounseled conviction resulting in only a suspended sen-
tence or presumably even a sentence resulting in years of po-
tential incarceration, is not constitutionally infirm and is ad-
missible in a future proceeding.94
did the majority one better, however, and their subsequent questioning, once confront-
ed by an equivocal response regarding a desire for counsel, was confined to an at-
tempt to clarify the suspect's intention. Id. at -, 114 S. Ct. at 2356-57. Four concur-
ring Justices in Davis, however, would have sanctioned further questioning after an
equivocal statement regarding counsel only if the subsequent questioning was of the
variety designed to clarify the suspect's intentions regarding counsel. Id. at -, 114 S.
Ct. at 2364.
89. Midkiff, 250 Va. at 266-67, 462 S.E.2d at 115. The record in Midkiff, unlike
that in Davis, did not suggest that follow up questioning by police of Midkiff related
to clarifying his ambiguous statement.
90. 252 Va. 113, 472 S.E.2d 789 (1996), rev'g, 21 Va. App. 22, 461 S.E.2d 411
(1995) (en banc).
91. Id. at 115-16, 472 S.E.2d at 790.
92. For example, as a predicate first offense in a charge, as was Griswold's, of
driving under the influence having previously been convicted of a like offense.
93. Griswold, 252 Va. at 116, 472 S.E.2d at 790.
94. See id. at 117, 472 S.E.2d at 791. How to determine whether a prior convic-
tion was counseled is entirely a bird of another feather. In Commonwealth v. Stich,
35 Va. Cir. 196 (Fairfax 1994), the circuit court adhered, by agreement of the parties,
to the analysis governing how to appraise a trial chronology for speedy trial purposes,
and held that in assessing whether there was an appearance or waiver of counsel in
an earlier conviction, a trial court is bound by the official record of the earlier pro-
ceeding, and may not entertain new evidence on that issue. Id. at 196-98.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY95
In Lyles v. Commonwealth,96 the defendant waived his right
to counsel before beginning his trial for reckless driving. After
arraignment, after the defendant entered a plea of not guilty,
and after the first witness began to testify, the trial judge in-
quired of the Commonwealth's Attorney if he was waiving any
possible jail sentence. The Commonwealth's Attorney responded
that he was not, and the trial judge then advised the parties he
was continuing the case for the defendant to retain an attorney.
When the trial resumed more than a month later, Lyles con-
tended that the resumed proceeding was in violation of his
guarantee against double jeopardy. The decision to grant the
continuance, the court of appeals held, was for the benefit of
the defendant, was not prejudicial, and was within the discre-
tion of the trial judge.97
On multiple occasions this past year, the Supreme Court of
Virginia and court of appeals considered whether a mistrial
may result in jeopardy so as to bar re-trial. In Allen v. Com-
monwealth,98 a jury convicted the defendant of grand larceny
and sentenced him accordingly. 9 The trial judge dismissed the
jury, and then, on motion of the Commonwealth, declared a
mistrial due to the fact that one of the jurors did not reside in
the jurisdiction where the trial was conducted.' 0 Defense
counsel agreed that the jury was improper, but argued against
retrial on jeopardy grounds. The supreme court held first that
the jury's verdict was a verdict of conviction, which placed the
defendant in jeopardy even though it was "not followed by any
judgment.'" ' The supreme court further held that the defect
in seating the non-resident juror was insufficient to give rise to
manifest necessity for a mistrial. 2 Therefore, the defendant's
95. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a guarantee
against double jeopardy. U.S. CONST., amend. V. Since the Fifth Amendment is so
frequently associated with the privilege against self-incrimination, double jeopardy is
discussed as a distinct subject area.
96. 21 Va. App. 187, 462 S.E.2d 915 (1995).
97. Id. at 191, 462 S.E.2d at 917.
98. 252 Va. 105, 472 S.E.2d 277 (1996).
99. Id. at 107, 472 S.E.2d at 278.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 109, 472 S.E.2d at 279 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 110, 472 S.E.2d at 280.
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first trial precluded his subsequent trials and sentencing.' 3
In Tyler v. Commonwealth,"' the court of appeals confirmed
that a mistrial declared in the absence of manifest necessity
will bar retrial because of the guarantee against double jeopar-
dy."0 5 In Tyler, a jury returned inconsistent verdicts of man-
slaughter and use of a firearm in the commission of murder.
On the prompting of the Commonwealth's Attorney, the trial.
judge ordered the jury to deliberate further in order to reconcile
its verdicts. Remarkably, the jury deadlocked, and the trial
judge declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection. The
court of appeals held that because the inconsistent verdicts
were not grounds for invalidating the jury's verdicts, no mani-
fest necessity existed for declaring a mistrial, and retrial was
barred.' 6 Similarly, where a trial judge erroneously declared
a mistrial on account of a mistaken belief that the defendant
had improperly attempted to cross-examine "a very material
witness" for the Commonwealth, the mistrial barred the
defendant's re-trial.'07
In a decision awaited by DUI practitioners around the Com-
monwealth, the court of appeals in Tench v. Commonwealth05
decided in an eight to one en banc opinion that the "adminis-
trative" suspension"' of a DUI arrestee's driver's license for
103. Id. The supreme court did not dismiss the prosecution against Allen, but
rather remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing on the first verdict of
guilt. Id. The jury in that first trial recommended a sentence of twelve months in jail
on a charge of breaking and entering, and two years imprisonment on a charge of
grand larceny. Id. at 107, 467 S.E.2d at 278. After the mistrial was declared on ac-
count of the non-resident juror, the defendant was tried a second time which resulted
in a hung jury and another mistrial. Id. A third trial also resulted in a mistrial due
to a police officer's testimony that the defendant had refused to make a statement.
This testimony violated the defendant's right not to incriminate himself. Finally, in a
fourth trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to a total of thirteen years
imprisonment. Id. at 108, 467 S.E.2d at 278.
104. 21 Va. App. 702, 467 S.E.2d 294 (1996).
105. Id. at 707, 467 S.E.2d at 296.
106. Id.
107. Brandon v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 82, 86, 467 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1996).
108. 21 Va. App. 200, 462 S.E.2d 922 (1995) (en banc).
109. Effective January 1, 1995, certain persons arrested for driving under the in-
fluence shall have their privilege to drive suspended immediately for a period of sev-
en days after the date of the offense. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
Typically, the trial of a DUI will take place long after the expiration of the seven
days.
1296
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seven days is not "punishment" within the meaning of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause, and does not bar a subsequent prosecution
for the underlying DUi." The court of appeals reasoned that
the seven day suspension operated to protect the public from
intoxicated drivers and to reduce alcohol related accidents. In
so concluding, the court of appeals rejected the argument, predi-
cated essentially on the holdings of a trilogy of U.S. Supreme
Court cases-United States v. Halper,"' Austin v. United
States," and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch" -that a nominal civil sanction is punishment within
the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, if its purpose was
at all to exact retribution for past misconduct or deter future
misconduct, and consequently ought to bar a subsequent prose-
cution for the same offense." In Brame v. Commonwealth,
110. Tench, 21 Va. App. at 208, 462 S.E.2d at 925. The so-called "DUI Double
Jeopardy" cases spawned seemingly endless rounds of litigation and debate around
the Commonwealth. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 36 Va. Cir. 494 (Richmond
City 1995) (holding that administrative suspension is punitive and a separate proceed-
ing from the related DUI trial, but that the elements of the two prosecutions were
not necessarily the same); Commonwealth v. House, 38 Va. Cir. 36 (Fairfax County
1995) (administrative suspension is punishment but not a separate proceeding from
DUI trial); City of Fredericksburg v. Eutsler, 36 Va. Cir. 460 (Fredericksburg City
1995) (administrative suspension is not punitive); Commonwealth v. Dederer, 38 Va.
Cir. 52 (Fairfax County 1995) (administrative suspension, though punitive, is not a
separate proceeding from DUI prosecution, nor is it the same offense as DUI); Town
of Leesburg v. Etchells, 37 Va. Cir. 155 (Loudoun County 1995) (administrative sus-
pension not punishment); Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 36 Va. Cir. 438 (Arlington
County 1995) (administrative suspension is neither punishment nor separate proceed-
ing from DUI prosecution); Commonwealth v. Branham, 36 Va. Cir. 357 (Orange
County 1995) (administrative suspension is not punishment nor a separate proceeding
from related DUI trial).
Ancillary issues regarding the administrative suspension statute also prompted
significant litigation efforts. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Teganini, 38 Va. Cir. 143
(Fairfax County 1995) (finding in administrative suspension challenge that no proba-
ble cause existed for breath test is not collateral estoppel bar to DUI prosecution);
Commonwealth v. Repp, 36 Va. Cir. 473 (Albemarle County 1995) (finding that no
right exists to appeal to a circuit court the general district court's aTffiance of ad-
ministrative suspension).
The analysis has also been applied to habitual offender proceedings. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Jacobsen, 36 Va. Cir. 315 (Loudoun County 1995) (same proposi-
tion); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 37 Va. Cir. 42 (Alexandria City 1995) (holding that
double jeopardy does not bar being declared a habitual offender).
111. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
112. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
113. 511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
114. Id. at - 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948. The lower-court arguments in the so-called
DUI Double Jeopardy cases engaged not only the question of whether the administra-
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the Supreme Court of Virginia"5 came to the same conclusion
as the court of appeals, and specifically concluded that a sanc-
tion "need not be exclusively remedial" in order to not be pun-
ishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy clause."'
VI. TRIALS
A. Discovery
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia afford some
discovery to persons accused of a crime in the Common-
wealth."' In Ramirez v. Commonwealth,"' a child sexual
abuse case, the court of appeals emphasized the limited nature
of that discovery. Ramirez had sought discovery of documents in
the possession of the Department of Social Services relating to
the allegations pending against him. Rule 3A:11 of the Supreme
Court of Virginia gives criminal defendants access to certain
documentary evidence in the Commonwealth's possession, but
specifically removed from the scope of the rule "statements
made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective . . . witness-
es to agents of the Commonwealth . .. in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case .... ," The court of
appeals reasoned that the Department of Social Services was,
by operation of law, an agency involved in the investigation of
tive suspension was punishment, but also whether it constituted a separate pro-
ceeding from the DUI prosecution, and whether the administrative suspension re-
quired proof of the same elements as a DUI prosecution. See supra note 110. The
court of appeals, ruling that administrative suspension did not constitute punishment,
did not reach these latter issues.
115. 252 Va. 122, 476 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
116. Id. at 128, 476 S.E.2d at 180. In Simmons v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 118,
475 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996), the supreme court also rejected a collateral estoppel de-
fense arising from the administrative suspension of a driver's license. There, in a
breath test refusal case, the defendant contended that Commonwealth's taking of his
operator's license through a § 46.2-391.2 administrative suspension triggered a col-
lateral estoppel bar to the Commonwealth's subsequent taking of his license for a
year. The supreme court concluded, however, that the administrative suspension was
"not a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction," and therefore no collateral
estoppel bar was raised to a subsequent judicial action based on the same facts and
issues. Id. at 120-21, 475 S.E.2d at 807.
117. See VA. S. CT. R. 3A.11 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
118. 20 Va. App. 292, 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995).
119. VA. S. CT. R. 3k11(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (emphasis added).
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the case against Ramirez, and consequently, the witness state-
ments given to DSS were not discoverable by virtue of Rule
3A: 1.12
In Lane v. Commonwealth,1 the court of appeals concluded
that the Commonwealth, in violation of Rule 3A:11, failed to
disclose to the defense a statement made by the defendant
which was contrary to the defendant's account at trial.'
When the Commonwealth introduced the statement at trial,
which was inconsistent with Lane's trial theory of self-defense,
Lane moved to exclude it from evidence on account of the dis-
covery violation. The court of appeals held, however, that the
remedy for a discovery violation was within the discretion of
the trial judge.' Lane refused to accept the trial judge's offer
of a continuance and did not move for a mistrial; instead he
"sought only [the] suppression of the truth."' The court of
appeals held that "[u]nder those circumstances, the admission
of the statement into evidence did not unjustly prejudice Lane's
presentation of his defense." '
In Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 6 the court of appeals af-
firmed the vitality of Virginia Code section 19.2-187 which
provides that, as a condition precedent to the admission of a
certificate of analysis, the Commonwealth is required, upon the
request of the defendant, to deliver a copy of the certificate to
the defendant seven days prior to trial.' Bottoms made a
timely request, but the Commonwealth failed to timely deliver
the certificate prior to trial.' During trial, the Common-
wealth moved to introduce the certificate, and Bottoms objected
120. Ramirez, 20 Va. App. at 296, 456 S.E.2d at 533. Note that the scope of dis-
covery in a criminal case has a constitutional dimension. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). However, Ramirez's allegation that he was denied exculpatory evi-
dence was held to be unfounded by the court of appeals and was not material to the
Rule 3A.11 discussion.
121. 20 Va. App. 592, 459 S.E.2d 525 (1995).
122. Id. at 593-94, 459 S.E.2d at 526.
123. Id. at 595, 459 S.E.2d at 527 (citing Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,
383-84, 345 S.E.2d 267, 277 (1986) (citations omitted)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 20 Va. App. 466, 457 S.E.2d 796 (1995).
127. I& at 468-69, 457 S.E.2d 797 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187(ii) (Repl. Vol.
1995)).
128. Id. at 468, 457 S.E.2d at 796-97.
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on the ground that the Commonwealth had not complied with
section 19.2-187. 9 The trial judge offered to continue the
matter for seven days, or to allow the defendant an opportunity
to view the certificate before continuing with the trial.130 Bot-
toms noted his objection to admission of the certificate under
either circumstance. The court of appeals agreed that section
19.2-187 required delivery "at least seven days prior to...
trial," and therefore held that the certificate was improperly
admitted.131
B. Expert Testimony and Assistance
In Farley v. Commonwealth,'32 the court of appeals found
error in a trial judge's refusal to permit a defendant's expert
testimony." The -defendant, a hunter who killed a hunting
companion, appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaugh-
ter on the ground that his expert was not allowed to testify
about how the defendant could have mistaken his companion
for a turkey. Farley proffered expert testimony on "closure, [the
brain's] tendency ... when in receipt of ambiguous stimuli, to
complete an image for the person based on the ambiguous stim-
uli even though the image does not actually exist."" The
court of appeals concluded that the expert's testimony would
have aided the jury in explaining Farley's misperception, and
that the testimony, though helpful, would not have invaded the
jury's province as fact-finder since the jury remained free to
believe or disbelieve Farley's account of events."'
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,'36 the court of appeals held
that it was not error for an expert to testify that the victim in
a sexual battery case suffered from post-traumatic stress disor-
der and that such a disorder is consistent with having recently
suffered a traumatic event."7 Similarly, in Brown v. Common-
129. Id. at 468, 457 S.E.2d at 797.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 469, 457 S.E.2d at 797 (alteration in original).
132. 20 Va. App. 495, 458 S.E.2d 310 (1995).
133. Id. at 497, 458 S.E.2d at 311.
134. Id. at 500, 458 S.E.2d at 312.
135. Id. at 502, 458 S.E.2d at 313.
136. 21 Va. App. 557, 466 S.E.2d 118 (1996).
137. Id. at 564-65, 466 S.E.2d at 121-22.
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wealth,"s the court of appeals held that it was error to not
permit expert testimony that a Commonwealth's witness suf-
fered from an antisocial personality disorder, a symptom of
which is to have no regard for the truth. 9
In Jenkins v. Commonwealth,' ° the court of appeals con-
cluded that an expert's testimony that the victim in an aggra-
vated sexual battery case had been sexually abused was im-
proper expert opinion testimony on the ultimate fact in is-
sue.' The en banc majority concluded, however, that the er-
ror was harmless since the expert's testimony was corroborated
by the child-victim's "bizarre sexually-oriented behavior," "the
child's familiarity with sexual acts," and the defendant's admis-
sion of participation in a sexual episode with the child.'
Husske v. Commonwealth,' discussed above in the Fifth
Amendment section, was a panel opinion from the court of
appeals holding that an indigent defendant was entitled, as a
function of due process, to expert assistance in a case turning
on DNA evidence. On en banc review by the court of appeals,
an equally divided court, without explanation, affirmed the trial
court's refusal to provide expert assistance.' 44
On review of that decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected the notion that a defendant's right to expert assistance
is "implicated only in those cases where the defendant's sanity
at the time he committed an offense is seriously in ques-
tion."' The supreme court held that, in order to have "an
adequate opportunity to present [his] claims fairly within the
adversary system,'" Due Process requires that indigent defen-
138. 22 Va- App. 316, 469 S.E.2d 90 (1996).
139. Id. at 321-23, 469 S.E.2d at 92-93.
140. 22 Va. App. 508, 471 S.E.2d 785 (1996) (en banc).
141. Id. at 517-18, 471 S.E.2d at 790.
142. Id. at 518, 471 S.E.2d at 790. "Appellant confessed that while holding the
child on his lap, he began to have sexual fantasies about the child. Appellant admit-
ted that he placed his hand on the child's penis and held it there for a minute, dur-
ing which time appellant had sexual thoughts about having oral sex with the child
when the child was older." Id.
143. 19 Va. App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331 (1994); see supra notes 72-79 and accompa-
nying text.
144. Husske v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 91, 462 S.E.2d (1995); see supra notes
72-79 and accompanying text.
145. Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 212, 476 S.E.2d 920, 926 (1996).
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dants have "the basic tools of an adequate defense,'" and that
"in certain instances, these basic tools may include the appoint-
ment of non-psychiatric experts [to aid the defense]."' The
supreme court concluded, however, that Husske had not made a
sufficient threshold showing of need for a DNA expert and that
the trial court had, therefore, not erred in refusing expert DNA
assistance.'47 The supreme court's holding opens the door to
defense motions, on the part of indigent defendants, for expert
assistance in nearly any case in which there is a demonstrable
need for such assistance. The supreme court at the same time,
however, set tight parameters for establishing such need:
We hold that an indigent defendant who seeks the appoint-
ment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth's expense,
must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the
assistance of the expert is "likely to be a significant factor
in his defense," and that he will be prejudiced by the lack
of expert assistance. An indigent defendant may satisfy this
burden by demonstrating that the services of an expert
would materially assist him in the preparation of his de-
fense and that the denial of such services would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial."*
146. Id. at 211, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
147. Id. at 213, 476 S.E.2d at 926. Although the supreme court majority character-
ized Husske's statement of need for expert assistance as "generalized statements in
his motions," id., the dissent noted that "at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's
evidence, [Husske] proffered some 400 pages of court opinions and testimony 'taken in
various other cases' that dramatized the nature and dimensions of the DNA dispute
prevalent at that time in the scientific community." Id. at 219, 476 S.E.2d at 930
(footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citations omitted) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985)). "-Mere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence is avail-
able is not enough to require that such help be provided." Id. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at
925 (quoting North Carolina v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1992)). The supreme
court's required threshold showing appears to be greater than the ordinary require-
ments of relevance (i.e., probative of a material issue). Moreover, the supreme court's
standard of review of whether denial of expert assistance-which is ostensibly a func-
tion of the constitutional guarantee of due process-is essentially the same as that
which the supreme court applies for non-constitutional error. See Lavinder v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (non-constitutional
error is harmless if it appears a fair trial and substantial justice were had, a lesser
standard than that applied to constitutional error which is reversible unless "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.")
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C. Jurors and Juror Selection
"Every prospective juror must stand indifferent to the cause,
'and any reasonable doubt as to a juror's qualifications must be
resolved in favor of the accused.""" A juror who had heard
that the defendant "may have committed a criminal offense,"
and who would hear the evidence with some "slight predisposi-
tion" against persons charged with sex offenses because a rela-
tive had been a victim of a sex crime, was not indifferent to the
cause beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court should
have struck the juror for cause. 50 In Williams v. Common-
wealth,' the en banc court of appeals affirmed a conviction
notwithstanding the seating of a correctional officer in the trial
of a defendant charged with inflicting bodily injury on an em-
ployee of a correctional facility on the theory that a juror's
employment, without more, should not result in an inference of
bias. 2
149. Clements v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 386, 392, 464 S.E.2d 534, 537
(1995).
150. Id at 393, 464 S.E.2d at 537-38.
151. 21 Va. App. 616, 466 S.E.2d 754 (1996) (en banc), rev'g, 19 Va. App. 600, 453
S.E.2d 575 (1995).
152. Id. at 618, 466 S.E.2d at 756. The panel opinion in Williams observed:
Nevertheless, per se exclusions are recognized. A person is disquali-
fied from serving as a juror in a criminal case if he or she is related to
the victim in the case because the "feelings" of a victim's relations are
"generally... excited by a personal wrong" to the victim, even though
the victim is not a party to the proceeding. This principle extends to
disqualify even a stockholder in a bank which is the victim of the crime
of larceny by check. Moreover, a prospective juror's bias may arise from
having the same occupation as the victim and, as a result, sharing a
significant risk of being a future victim of the same crime.
In this case, the prospective juror and the victim shared an occu-
pation which equally exposed them to a unique and significant risk of
being a victim of the crime with which the defendant was charged. The
risk is not one shared by the public at large.
This shared risk promotes a kinship between the prospective juror
and the correctional guard who was the victim, not unlike that of a
familial kinship. This relationship would, not unexpectedly, cause the
"feelings" of the correctional guard on the panel to be "excited" by the
injury to the victim, with whom he would closely identify. Declarations of
impartiality by such a prospective juror would do little to assure that the
jury was "as free from suspicion as possible." The appearance of bias
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In Jenkins v. Commonwealth," a juror revealed, in the
middle of trial, that he knew the defendant from having worked
with him ten years prior and that the juror and the defendant
had yelled at one another once over a disagreement. The juror
also stated that knowing the defendant would not affect his
verdict because he "already had a decision made." When later
asked by the trial judge if he had prejudged the case before the
case was submitted to the jury as a whole for deliberation, the
juror first stated that he had "taken in everything, you know,
I'm just weighing and balancing in my own head." Then later,
when asked if he could deliberate, the juror responded in the
affirmative. The court of appeals held that since the juror stat-
ed he could deliberate and that he did not bear the defendant
any animus, and since the record did not reflect whether a vote
for guilt or innocence would flow from the juror's "potential
prejudgment of the case" the trial judge was not required to
declare a mistrial."
In Riley v. Commonwealth,5 a trial for the rape of a young
female jogger, the Commonwealth peremptorily struck "women
who are most unlike the victim in terms of age [because] many
times [in rape cases] the elderly female jurors have difficulty
accepting certain aspects of the cases, and they have a difficult
time considering the evidence and reaching a verdict of
guilt."56 Although the court of appeals held that age was a
permissible basis for exercising a peremptory challenge, the
prosecutor's striking of women based on stereotypical views of
how women would think or react was constitutionally
impermissible.' "The fact that the Commonwealth used age
to identify which women to strike does not overcome the consti-
tutional inmfirity." 58
In Charity v. Commonwealth,'59 the court of appeals agreed
would remain indelible. Consequently, we hold that a correctional guard
is disqualified per se from serving on a jury considering a charge of
violating Code § 18.2-55.
19 Va. App. at 603-04, 453 S.E.2d at 577 (citations and footnote omitted).
153. 22 Va. App. 508, 471 S.E.2d 785 (1996).
154. Id. at 516-17, 471 S.E.2d at 789.
155. 21 Va. App. 330, 464 S.E.2d 508 (1995).
156. Id. at 334, 464 S.E.2d at 510.
157. Id. at 335-37, 464 S.E.2d at 510-11.
158. Id. at 336, 464 S.E.2d at 510.
159. 22 Va. App. 582, 471 S.E.2d 821 (1996), reh'g granted, and opinion with-
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with the defendant that the trial judge had erroneously insisted
on personally asking all questions of the venire during voir
dire, and refused to allow the defendant's lawyer to ask the
questions directly.160 By statute, counsel may personally ques-
tion the venire during voir dire.6' Since, however, the trial
judge asked each of the questions submitted to him in writing
by defense counsel, and no other prejudice was apparent, the
court of appeals held the error to be harmless.'62 The dissent
countered that a case such as this "defies harmless error analy-
sis," since, "[alt the heart of an attorney's right to voir dire the
venire is the attorney's well-founded desire to engage in one-on-
one interaction with a potential juror, and thereby to personally
analyze all of the attendant variables inherent in such an inter-
action."'" It is important to note that the present precedental
value of Charity is uncertain as the opinion was withdrawn and
a rehearing granted.
drawn, July 24, 1996 (available on Westlaw).
160. Id. (publication pages not available) The trial judge, when asked by defense
counsel for the opportunity to personally question the venire, responded that he
would not allow that and said, i[t]hat's what rve always done, and that's what rm
going to do." Id. (publication pages not available) (Benton, J., dissenting). The majori-
ty, in a footnote, observed, 'The trial judge's action in this case is deeply troubling,
not simply because of the error involved, but because it may have been in deliberate
disregard of a known statutory directive." Id. at n.3 (publication pages not available).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Repl. Vol 1992).
162. Charity, 22 Va. App. 582, 471 S.E.2d 821 (1996) (publication pages not avail-
able).
163. Id. (publication pages not available) (Benton, J., dissenting). The dissent went
on to observe:
A judge's role as authority figure in the courtroom exacerbates the
[courtroom's intimidating atmosphere], because many prospective jurors
are afraid to say anything that might displease the judge.
The task of the lawyer conducting the voir dire is to create an
atmosphere that encourages honest and straightforward answers that
reveal the prospective juror's personality, experiences, and attitudes. This
can be done by establishing a relationship with prospective jurors that
conveys an attitude of respect and recognition of them as individu-
als ....
The attorney's tone of voice and demeanor is an important deter-
minant of the kind of relationship she or he will have with prospective
jurors.
Id. at n.6. (Benton, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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D. Other Evidentiary Issues
If the Commonwealth is required to prove a material issue in
a criminal case, the defendant is not entitled to have that evi-
dence sanitized. In a prosecution for escape, the Commonwealth
carries the burden of proving that the defendant was lawfully
in custody at the time of the alleged escape.' Therefore, the
court of appeals held, in Johnson v. Commonwealth,'65 that
the Commonwealth could permissibly introduce into evidence
the bench warrant for the defendant's arrest which was the
predicate for the escape charge.' Since the trial judge need
not sanitize the admissible evidence, there was no abuse of
discretion in admitting the bench warrant complete with the
information on it that the defendant had failed to appear for a
sentencing hearing on unrelated felony charges. 6 '
Section 19.2-271.2 of the Virginia Code was amended in 1996
to transfer the spousal privilege in criminal cases from the
accused spouse to the testifying spouse and removed the re-
quirement that a spouse seek the consent of his partner before
testifying against the partner."
E. Juvenile Justice
The past year has seen sweeping reforms in the area of juve-
nile justice. Only a summary recital of some of the most con-
spicuous changes will be covered here.'69 Perhaps the most
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-478 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
165. 21 Va. App. 102, 462 S.E.2d 105 (1995).
166. Id. at 105-07, 462 S.E.2d at 126-27.
167. Id at 106-07, 462 S.E.2d at 127.
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996). The statute left intact the
exception to the spousal privilege in cases where the offense in question is alleged to
have been committed by one spouse against the other, against a minor child of ei-
ther, and in forgery and sexual assault cases. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
169. The public sentiment that juvenile justice procedures and policies required
reform is manifest in the Final Report of the Governor's Commission on Juvenile
Justice Reform. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTiCE REFORM, FINAL RE-
PORT (December 20, 1995) [hereinafter Governor's Commission Report]. That report
observed that protection of society from crime is a clear priority of Governor Allen's
administration, that crime committed by juveniles is increasingly common and serious,
that "[t]eenagers who commit heinous felonies such as murder, rape, and robbery
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significant is the change in the way that Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts are divested of jurisdiction over certain cases.
Prior to July 1, 1996, children fourteen years of age or- older
accused of crimes could have their cases transferred for trial to
the circuit court (such transfer carries the possibility of adult
disposition) only after a judicial finding (i) of probable cause
that the juvenile committed the offense and (ii) that the juve-
nile was "not a proper person to remain within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court" or that the offense was one sufficiently
serious to presumptively merit trial as an adult."'
After July 1, 1996, juveniles fourteen years of age or older
who are charged with capital murder, first or second degree
murder, murder by lynching or aggravated malicious wounding,
on a showing of probable cause, will have their cases automati-
cally transferred to the circuit court for trial as an adult."'
Where a juvenile fourteen years of age or older is charged with
felony murder, injury by mob, abduction, malicious wounding,
malicious wounding of a police officer, poisoning, products adul-
teration, robbery, caijacking, rape, forcible sodomy, or object
sexual penetration, the decision whether to transfer the case to
the circuit court lies within the discretion of the
should be tried and sentenced as adults." Id. at 2. The report also concluded that the
juvenile justice system, prior to this year's reform
fail[ed] to adequately punish juvenile offenders. Juvenile judges simply
lack the sanctions needed for heinous crimes like homicide, rape and
robbery. At the other extreme, juvenile courts too often fail to act deci-
sively with young offenders who are just taking their first steps down
the path of lawlessness. Yet it is these early offenders, if dealt with
decisively, who are most likely to benefit from meaningful opportunities
for reform. When the juvenile courts do impose a sentence on a defen-
dant, too often the only alternatives available are assignment to proba-
tion under the nominal supervision of an overworked probation officer, or
commitment to an overcrowded and understaffed juvenile correctional cen-
ter.
Id. at 5. Section 16.1-277 of the Virginia Code was amended in 1996 to reflect that
in addition to the "the welfare of the child and the family, the safety of the commu-
nity and the protection of the rights of victims are the paramount concerns of the
Commonwealth" VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (RepI Vol. 1996).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994). The class of offenses for
which transfer was possible without a determination of the propriety of a juvenile
remaining in the juvenile system was specifically enumerated by the former statute.
Id. The former statute also permitted trial as an adult of juveniles who had previous-
ly been tried as an adult. Id.
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
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Commonwealth's Attorney.'72 In either the automatic transfer
cases or prosecutor transfer cases, a finding that there is no
probable cause or a dismissal of the case in the juvenile court
is no bar to the subsequent indictment of the juvenile.'73 The
procedure for transfer of all other felonies remains the same as
the pre-1996 law.'74
Juveniles who are not transferred to circuit court for trial as
adults, may be committed to the custody of the Department of
Juvenile Justice (formerly the Department of Youth and Family
Services) 75 for an indeterminate period, to be determined by
the Department, but as of July 1, 1996, for no longer than
thirty-six months.'76 Juveniles deemed to be serious offenders
pursuant to section 16.1-285.1 may be committed for a determi-
nate period by the sentencing judge, either in the juvenile court
or in circuit court, for up to seven years but no longer than the
juvenile's twenty-first birthday.77
As of July 1, 1996 juvenile court proceedings involving adults
or juveniles fourteen years of age or older, charged with an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, shall
be open to the public but may, for good cause shown, be
closed.'78 The records of proceedings finding juveniles guilty of
a delinquent act which would be a felony if committed by an
adult shall no longer be expunged. 79
In Cheeks v. Commonwealth,8 ' the court of appeals held
that a juvenile was entitled, as a function of procedural due
process of law, to be notified of the time and place of the hear-
ing convened to determine whether to transfer his case from
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to
the Circuit Court.'8 ' Such a transfer would result in exposing
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996); see VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
269.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 66.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-302(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-306(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
388(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
180. 20 Va. App. 578, 459 S.E.2d 107 (1995).
181. Id. at 586, 459 S.E.2d at 110-11; see also Karim v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.
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the juvenile to the spectrum of potential adult sanctions, includ-
ing lengthy penitentiary time, for his criminal conduct. The
court of appeals reasoned that the provisions of the transfer
statute are "mandatory and jurisdictional" and not merely "di-
rectory and procedural."'82 Moreover, the transfer proceeding
conducted in the juvenile's absence was sufficiently defective as
to not be cured by the trial judge's after-the-fact offer to receive
whatever evidence the juvenile cared to offer on the issue of
transfer." Nor did the juvenile's refusal to accept the trial
judge's offer waive his objection to the defective transfer pro-
ceeding."
F. Miscellaneous
In 1996 the General Assembly created a rebuttable presump-
tion that persons charged with, and previously convicted of
distribution or transportation of drugs or acts of violence, in the
preceding sixteen years, will not appear at trial or are a danger
to the public.'
VII. CRIMES
Both the courts and the General Assembly made significant
contributions to defining what amounts to a crime this past
year.
A- Traffic Offenses
In Travis v. Commonwealth,' the court of appeals elabo-
rated on its holding in Bishop v. Commonwealth' that a per-
App. 652, 466 S.E.2d 772 (1996), affd en banc, 22 Va. App. 767, 473 S.E.2d 103
(1996) (holding that parents must also be given notice of a transfer hearing); Douglas
v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 324, 451 S.E.2d 49 (1994) (holding that the trial court
is required to review the juvenile court transcript or conduct a hearing before a
transfer).
182. Cheeks, 20 Va. App. at 584, 459 S.E.2d at 110.
183. Id. at 585-86, 459 S.E.2d at 110-11.
184. Id.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
186. 20 Va. App. 410, 457 S.E.2d 420 (1995).
187. 20 Va. App. 206, 455 S.E.2d 765 (1995).
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son who operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated within the
meaning of Virginia Code section 18.2-266 is not per se operat-
ing so as to "endanger the life, limb, or property, of another"
which, after having been declared a habitual offender, would
elevate the misdemeanor of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated to a felony." s The court of appeals in Travis
concluded that evidence of the defendant's intoxication in com-
bination with evidence of his "weaving within his lane of traffic
and even 'over the left line'" was sufficient to prove that the
driving "'of itself... endanger[ed] the life, limb, or property of
another.
" 18 9
If a court erroneously permits admission of a certificate of
analysis of a defendant's breath sample in a DUI prosecution,
that error can be harmless.90 Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals stated in Castillo v. Commonwealth,"9 where the evi-
dence is neither so overwhelming as to prove the defendant's
guilt even in the absence of the improperly admitted certificate,
nor so weak as to render the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law absent the certificate, the error is not harmless since the
court could not say "'what effect the breathalyzer evidence had
on the trial court's decision."9 2
In Stacy v. Commonwealth,93 the court of appeals held that
the results of a preliminary breath test administered by police
in the field are admissible at a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence for want of probable cause notwithstanding the statu-
tory bar to admission of such evidence in any "prosecution."94
The court of appeals reasoned that a motion to suppress was
not a prosecution within the meaning of the statute proscribing
admission of the preliminary breath test.'95 The court of
appeals' reasoning is sound inasmuch as a rule proscribing the
admissibility of the preliminary breath test in all court proceed-
188. Id. at 211-12, 455 S.E.2d at 767-68.
189. Travis, 20 Va. App. at 417, 457 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 462-
357(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1996)).
190. See Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 315 S.E.2d 242 (1984).
191. 21 Va. App. 482, 465 S.E.2d 146 (1995).
192. Id at 490, 465 S.E.2d at 150 (quoting Durant v. City of Suffolk, 4 Va. App.
445, 449, 358 S.E.2d 732, 734 (1987)).
193. 22 Va. App. 417, 470 S.E.2d 584 (1996).
194. Id. at 423-24, 470 S.E.2d at 587.
195. Id. at 423, 470 S.E.2d at 587.
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ings would render administration of the test meaningless.
Persons convicted of DUI may now be required to install an
ignition interlock device on their motor vehicles as a condition
of receiving a restricted license. 6 The device measures a
person's breath alcohol content and prevents operation of the
car if the test is positive for alcohol. After having received a
first conviction for DUI, all persons must now attend the Vir-
ginia Alcohol Safety Action Program.9'
B. Guns
In Main v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals concluded
that a weapon is concealed, within the meaning of the statute
proscribing possession of a concealed weapon, 9 if "[i]t was
hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional
opportunity to view it.""°' That rule applies even if the gun's
handle is "extending outside of [the defendant's] pocket" where
the handle was "covered by [a] duffle bag. 20
1
It is reversible error to refuse to instruct a jury that a defen-
dant cannot be convicted of use of a firearm in the commission
of malicious wounding if the jury acquits the defendant on the
predicate charge of malicious wounding, but convicts instead on
the lesser-included offense of attempted unlawful wounding. 2
Unlawful wounding is simply not one of the enumerated offens-
es in Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1 which proscribes the use
of a firearm in the commission of certain felonies, including
malicious wounding.20 3 The trial judge's obligation to properly
instruct the jury on that question exists independently of a
clear request for such an instruction by the defendant or any
other party.
2 °4
In a prosecution for use of a firearm in the commission of a
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270.1 (Repl. VoL 1996).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (RepL Vol. 1996).
198. 20 Va. App. 370, 457 S.E.2d 400 (1995)(en banc).
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
200. Main, 20 Va. App. at 372-73, 457 S.E.2d at 402.
201. Id. at 372, 457 S.E.2d at 402.
202. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 547, 458 S.E.2d 599 (1995) (en bane).
203. Id. at 554, 458 S.E.2d at 602.
204. Id at 553-54, 458 S.E.2d at 602.
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felony,"' the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
actually used a firearm." 6 That standard is met when a bank
teller testifies that the defendant handed the teller a note, told
her to give him the money, and "pointed to his pocket...
[a]nd that indicated to [the teller] there was a gun, like he had
stated in his note.'"07 Although the victim's mere perception
or belief that the defendant was armed is insufficient to prove
the defendant used a firearm, a defendant's admission in con-
junction with the victim's perception is sufficient."0
In Miller v. Commonwealth,2" the defendant was convicted
of a first offense use of a firearm in the commission of a felo-
ny.21 Between the time he was found guilty of that offense
and his sentencing on that offense, the defendant was found
guilty in another jurisdiction of a first offense use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony.2 ' In the first prosecution, in-
stead of sentencing the defendant to the statutorily prescribed
sentence of three years in prison for a first offense, the trial
judge sentenced the defendant as a second time offender (based
on the defendant's conviction before sentencing) to five
years." The court of appeals affirmed the sentence on the
theory that the recidivist provision of the statute was intended
to enhance punishment at the time of sentencing.21
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
206. Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 441 S.E.2d 342 (1994).
207. Elmore v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 424, 426, 470 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1996).
208. Id. at 428-29, 470 S.E.2d 590; see also McBride v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.
App. 730, 732-35, 473 S.E.2d 85, 86-87 (1996) (holding that defendant who "push[ed]'
something 'up against [the victim's] back" and stated, 'Don't turn around or I'll
shoot'" used a firearm within the meaning of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1, even
though the victim never saw what it was that the defendant used). The holding in
McBride appears to conflict with the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 441 S.E.2d 342 (1994), which held that in
a section 18.2-53.1 prosecution, the Commonwealth must prove use of an actual fire-
arm. Id. at 218, 441 S.E.2d at 344. The victim's testimony of seeing "something pro-
truding ... from [the] pocket of [the defendants] jacket," the defendant's statement,
"This is a stickup," and his pointing of some unseen object at the victim were insuffi-
dent to prove use of an actual firearm. Id.
209. 22 Va. App. 497, 471 S.E.2d 780 (1996).
210. Id. at 499-500, 471 S.E.2d at 781.
211. Id. at 500, 471 S.E.2d at 781.
212. Id. at 498-99, 471 S.E.2d at 780-81.
213. Id. at 501, 471 S.E.2d at 782.
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C. Drugs
The court of appeals in Jones v. Commonwealth214 affired
a conviction for second offense distribution of cocaine. That the
defendant had not been convicted of the first distribution prior
to his arrest for the second did not render the evidence insuffi-
cient." Moreover, the fact that Jones's first conviction for dis-
tribution of cocaine was reversed on appeal, during the penden-
cy of his appeal of the second conviction, was a matter the
court of appeals refused to address since the question was not
presented in Jones's petition for appeal, and therefore the court
of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear the question.216 Al-
so in Jones, the court of appeals held that defendant's distri-
bution of cocaine was proved by circumstantial evidence where
the evidence proved that the informant, who left police without
cocaine, walked to the defendant and returned to the police
with cocaine." That the informant did not testify he bought
drugs from the defendant and was out of police view for a
period of time did not break the chain of circumstantial evi-
dence in light of the absence of evidence that the informant
could have acquired the drugs somewhere other than from the
defendant.21
The chain of custody in a drug case is not broken simply
because other police officers have access to the arresting
officer's drug locker." 9 Also, the fact that the analyzing labo-
ratory returns the contraband to the police officer by UPS, in-
stead of the U.S. Postal Service, does not give rise to any pre-
sumption of irregularity.'0
The General Assembly in 1996 criminalized, and made pun-
214. 21 Va. App. 435, 464 S.E.2d 558 (1995) (en banc).
215. See id. at 439-40, 464 S.E.2d at 560.
216. Id. at 437 n.1, 464 S.E.2d at 559 n.1.
217. Id. at 444, 464 S.E.2d at 562-63.
218. Id.
219. Brown v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 552, 556, 466 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1996).
220. Id at 556-57, 466 S.E.2d at 118. In Commonwealth v. Scott, 38 Va. Cir. 446
(Richmond City 1996), the circuit court held that the 3.96 pounds of material, the
majority of which was leaf marijuana and some of which was comprised of seeds and
stems (which, by statutory definition, are not marijuana), was sufficient to prove that
the weight of marijuana was in excess of one-half ounce. Id. at 453-54.
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ishable as a Class 5 felony, maintenance of a fortified drug
house-a structure which is substantially modified to prevent
lawful entry by the police-used for the illegal trafficking of
drugs, and the object of a valid search warrant."
D. Sex Crimes
Where a sixteen-year-old girl is diagnosed as mentally retard-
ed, with an IQ ranging between fifty-eight and seventy, a twen-
ty-seven-year-old man who has sex with her does not neces-
sarily do so "'through the use of [her] mental incapacity" as
proscribed by section 18.2-61 of the Virginia Code.2" The
court of appeals, in Adkins v. Commonwealth,2" concluded
that in order to show a violation of the statute, the Common-
wealth must prove that the victim's "mental incapacity" was
such as to preclude her understanding "the nature and conse-
quences of the sexual act involved.' "' The court of appeals
reasoned that in enacting section 18.2-61 the legislature did not
intend to "unfairly punish the sexual partners of those mentally
impaired or mentally retarded persons who have a basic under-
standing of the act and consequences of sexual intercourse and
are capable of making a volitional choice to engage or not en-
gage in such conduct.""
In Howard v. Commonwealth, 6 a separate case construing
the same statute, the court of appeals held that a fifteen-year-
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-258.02 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
222. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 332, 337, 457 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1995)
(quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1996)). Virginia Code § 18.2-61
states in relevant part: "A. If any person has sexual intercourse with a complaining
witness who is not his or her spouse ... (ii) through the use of the complaining
witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness . . . he or she shall be guilty of
rape." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
223. 20 Va. App. 332, 457 S.E.2d 382 (1995).
224. Id. at 343, 457 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1994)). In an unrelated sex-offense case involving a minor child, the court of
appeals, in refusing to find a confrontation clause violation arising from the cross-
examination of the victim, gave the practical advice that a child's "responsiveness
could not have been enhanced by being told to 'spit it [(her testimonyj] out,' to go
'back to your favorite subject [(the alleged sex offense)] again,' or 'you must like the
judge a lot better than me.'" Cramp v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 609, 616, 460
S.E.2d 238, 241 (1995).
225. Adkins, 20 Va. App. at 345, 457 S.E.2d at 388.
226. 21 Va. App. 473, 465 S.E.2d 142 (1995).
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old girl's high degree of intoxication did not render her
"physically helpless" so as to be unable to consent to sexual
intercourse.' The evidence in Howard proved the girl's refus-
al to have oral sex with someone other than the defendant; her
solicitation to have sex with other people at the party; her
participation in sexual relations with other people at the party,
including Howard; and that the girl never told Howard she did
not want to have sex with him. The girl's subsequent intense
vomiting and intermittent consciousness did not prove her
physical helplessness at the time of the conduct involving the
defendant.2"
In Clifton v. Commonwealth 9 the court of appeals held
that although the consent of the complainant is a defense to
rape, the defendant's mere reasonable perception of the
complainant's consent is not." ° The court of appeals reasoned
that although the defendant must have the specific intent to
commit rape, that requirement is satisfied by "proof that the
accused knowingly and intentionally committed the acts consti-
tuting the elements of rape.""' Consent is not an element of
rape but rather a defense which requires a showing that the
complainant in fact consented and not simply that the defen-
dant thought she did. 2 The dissent in Clifton countered that
if the defendant reasonably believed that the complainant con-
sented then the jury should have been instructed to acquit.'
The majority, according to the dissent, essentially rendered rape
a strict liability crime akin to statutory rape since the
227. Id. at 479, 465 S.E.2d at 145.
228. Id. at 480-81, 465 S.E.2d at 145-46. In reversing Howard's conviction, the
court of appeals concluded, '[tihe conduct of [appellant] cannot be condoned. It was
disgraceful It was enough to shame one steeped in moral infamy. But he was not
tried for that. Rape was the charge laid at his door and the Commonwealth's evi-
dence fail[ed] to sustain it.'" Id. at 481, 465 S.E.2d at 146 (citation omitted). In Com-
monwealth v. Culbreath, 36 Va. Cir. 188 (Fairfax County 1995), the circuit court held
that, though the defendant's conduct was "deplorfable]" and the victim's suffering
"regret[able]," where consent is accomplished by the defendant impersonating another,
the charge of rape cannot be sustained. Id. at 188.
229. 22 Va. App. 178, 468 S.E.2d 155 (1996).
230. Id. at 184, 468 S.E.2d at 158.
231. Id-
232. Id.
233. See 1d. at 189-91, 468 S.E.2d at 160-61 (Benton, J., dissenting).
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defendant's state of mind regarding the complainant's consent is
now immaterial.2"
E. Larceny and Robbery
Robbery requires not just the employment of force in the
commission of a larceny, but the force or intimidation must be
directed toward the victim's person. 5 So held the court of ap-
peals in Winn v. Commonwealth,3 ' where the evidence proved
that the defendant took the victim's purse "very strongly" from
her shoulder and arm, but that no struggle ensued and the
matter lasted only seconds. 37 The court of appeals, in adopt-
ing the majority view of the states, reasoned that "[t]he
touching or violation necessary to prove [robbery] may be indi-
rect, but cannot result merely from the force associated with
the taking."
8
Grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-included of-
fense of robbery. The court of appeals has held that since value
is an element of grand larceny but not of robbery, and force or
intimidation is an element of robbery but not of grand larceny,
a defendant cannot be convicted of grand larceny in a
prosecution for robbery where the charge of robbery is struck
for want of evidence of force or intimidation."9 The court of
appeals has also concluded, however, that robbery by its defini-
tion does include the offense of petit larceny since that offense
does not require proof of value and is therefore entirely sub-
suned within the offense of robbery.4
234. Id. at 189, 468 S.E.2d at 159 (Benton, J., dissenting).
235. Winn v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 179, 181-82, 462 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1995).
236. 21 Va. App. 179, 462 S.E.2d 911 (1995).
237. See id. at 181, 462 S.E.2d 912.
238. Id. (quoting Bivins v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 750, 752, 454 S.E.2d 741,
742 (1995) (citation omitted)).
239. See Graves v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 161, 164, 462 S.E.2d 902, 903
(1995), affd en banc, 22 Va. App. 262, 468 S.E.2d 710 (1996).
240. See 21 Va. App. at 166-67, 462 S.E.2d at 904-05. The court of appeals did
leave open the possibility that grand larceny could be a lesser-included offense of
robbery had the indictment alleged the value of the stolen property:
Because the indictment against Graves did not set forth allegations of
value or of theft from the person (i.e., larceny from the person, not rob-
bery], it did not charge grand larceny from the person. Therefore, grand
larceny from the person was not a lesser offense included within the
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In Bruce v. Commonwealth,"' the court of appeals held that
in a breaking and entering prosecution, the breaking need not
be from the outside into the building.' Bruce broke into his
estranged girlfriend's home through the front door, but without
the intent to assault with a deadly weapon, the offense with
which he was charged. While there, he conceived of the intent
to so assault her and then opened and walked out the back
door, retrieved a gun, and re-entered through the still open
back door. The court of appeals held that the exit from the
home was a breaking and that the breaking took place with the
requisite intent to assault.'
F. Murder
In Haywood v. Commonwealth,' the defendant, who was
driving in a highly dangerous manner, came frighteningly close
to killing or doing serious injury to two police officers who were
attempting to apprehend him.' The court of appeals held,
however, that since the circumstantial evidence proved that the
defendant's intent could have been to escape, the evidence did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's specific
intent to kill which was a necessary element of his convictions
for attempted capital murder.'
In Rivers v. Commonwealth, ' the court of appeals outlined
the parameters of accomplice liability in a case stemming from
a gunfight between the defendant and a third party. The two
men shot at each other and Rivers's rival accidentally killed an
innocent bystander. Rivers did not share the killer's intention.
In fact, he had an opposite one. Therefore, Rivers could not be
a principal in the second degree to the killing.' Nor does a
theory of transferred intent apply to Rivers since Rivers did not
robbery specification of the indictment.
Id. at 166, 462 S.E.2d at 904.
241. 22 Va. App. 264, 469 S.E.2d 64 (1996).
242. Id. at 270, 469 S.E.2d at 67-68.
243. I. at 269-70, 469 S.E.2d at 67.
244. 20 Va. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
245. Id. at 564-65, 458 S.E.2d at 607.
246. See id. at 567-68, 458 S.E.2d at 608-09.
247. 21 Va. App. 416, 464 S.E.2d 549 (1995).
248. Id. at 421-22, 464 S.E.2d at 551.
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accidentally shoot the victim; rather, Rivers's opponent did.249
Nor does the felony-murder rule apply to this case since liabili-
ty under that theory lies "only where the act of killing is either
actually or constructively committed by a felon or by someone
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common de-
sign or purpose."2' 0 The court of appeals further categorically
rejected adoption of the "provocative act murder" theory in
which a person who does not intend a killing, but who acts in
such a way as to "'likely cause death,'" thereby provoking a
third party to reasonably kill in response to the act, is guilty of
murder.2 5 ' The court of appeals reasoned that the legislature,
not the courts, is the appropriate forum for amending the com-
mon-law concept of felony-murder. 52
The court of appeals also held that there is no such crime as
attempted felony-murder."Ss The court of appeals reasoned in
Goodson v. Commonwealth' that the malice required for felo-
ny-murder-where a homicide takes place during a felony-is
implied "from the actor's intent to commit the underlying felo-
ny." However, where no homicide takes place, and only an
attempt is alleged, the Commonwealth must prove a specific
intent to kill; therefore, the rationale behind felony-murder is
inapplicable to an attempt crime.
249. Id. at 422, 464 S.E.2d at 551.
250. Id. at 423, 464 S.E.2d at 552 (emphasis added) (citing Wooden v. Common-
wealth, 222 Va. 758, 763-65, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814-16 (1981)).
251. Id. at 425, 464 S.E.2d at 553 (citing People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373-74
(1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)). The court of appeals, in rejecting
the "provocative act murder" theory, recited from In re Aurelio R., 212 Cal. Rptr. 868
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985), for an explanation of that theory:
To satisfy the "actus reus" element of this crime the defendant or one of
his confederates must commit an act which provokes a third party into
firing the fatal shot. To satisfy the "mens rea" element, the defendant or
his confederate must know this act has a "high probability" not merely a
"foreseeable probability" of eliciting a life-threatening response from the
third party.
Rivers, 21 Va. App. at 425, 464 S.E.2d at 553 (quoting In re Aurelio R., 212 Cal.
Rptr. at 870-71).
252. Rivers, 21 Va. App. at 427, 464 S.E.2d at 554.
253. See Goodson v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 61, 467 S.E.2d 848 (1996).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 76, 467 S.E.2d at 855.
256. See id.
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G. Generally
The court of appeals came to grips in Cook v. Common-
wealth 7 with what constitutes the sine qua non of crime.
There the defendant appealed his conviction for attempted sec-
ond degree murder. The offense occurred in August of 1993. In
July of 1993, the General Assembly elevated the maximum
punishment for second degree murder from twenty to forty
years." s Section 18.2-26 prescribes the punishments for at-
tempted crimes by reference to the maximum possible penalty
for the underlying offense. 9 The version of section 18.2-26 in
effect at the time of Cook's offense included no penalty at all
for attempted felonies wherein the underlying felony carried a
maximum penalty of forty years.260 Since "[Cook's] conduct
may have been proscribed by statute, it was an offense without
a penalty," and because crimes are comprised of both
"'forbidden conduct and a prescribed penalty,'" Cook was errone-
ously convicted for conduct which constituted no crime at the
time of the offense.26'
In Lawless v. County of Chesterfield,"2 the court of appeals
relied on the notion that cities and counties in Virginia derive
their authority to legislate from the State and that localities'
legislation which exceeds or contradicts the parameters of that
authorized by the State is unlawful.2" The court of appeals
therefore reversed a criminal conviction stemming from breach
of a county landfill regulation.'
257. 20 Va. App. 510, 458 S.E.2d 317 (1995).
258. Id. at 512, 458 S.E.2d at 318.
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-26 (Cum. Supp. 1994); Cook, 20 Va. App. at 512, 458
S.E.2d at 318.
260. Cook, 20 Va. App. at 512, 458 S.E.2d at 318.
261. I& at 512-13, 458 S.E.2d at 318-19 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScoTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRnImNAL LAw § 1.2(d) (1986)).
262. 21 Va. App. 495, 465 S.E.2d 153 (1995).
263. Id. at 499, 465 S.E.2d at 154-55.
264. Id. at 502-03, 465 S.E.2d at 156. Considerations of due process also limit the
government's authority to legislate: the circuit court of the City of Virginia Beach, in
Commonwealth v. Hyatt, held that a state statute criminalizing picketing in front of a
residence was an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. 37 Va. Cir. 384 (Va.
Beach City 1995).
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In Granger v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals af-
firmed the high burden the Commonwealth faces in circumstan-
tial evidence cases. In Granger, the defendant's fingerprints on
a broken bottle of Canadian Mist found next to the victim-who
was missing cash, had a head wound and was lying in a pool of
his own blood-were insufficient to prove the defendant was the
criminal agent. 6' The court of appeals held that the Common-
wealth had failed to "exclude the hypothesis that [the defen-
dant] may have handled the bottle for an innocent purpose
before the robbery."267
In Castell v. Commonwealth,2" the court of appeals conclud-
ed that "custody," as that term is employed in search and sei-
zure inquiries, does not necessarily have the same meaning in
Virginia's escape from custody statute.269 There the defendant,
apprised by the police of their intention to arrest him and only
an inch from the grasp of one officer, fled from the police. The
court of appeals concluded that, for purposes of securing a con-
viction for escape from custody, "custody does not require direct
physical restraint," and set the standard for gauging custody as
whether "a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding
would know that he was not free to leave."27 The en banc dis-
sent argued that prior Fourth Amendment cases from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia have held that a person's failure to
submit to a show of police authority renders the encounter
something less than a seizure and that the penal statute gov-
erning escapes ought to be construed strictly against the Com-
monwealth and consistent with prior decisions of the courts. 1
265. 20 Va. App. 576, 459 S.E.2d 106 (1995).
266. Id. at 577-78, 456 S.E.2d at 106-07.
267. Id. at 577, 459 S.E.2d at 106.
268. 21 Va. App. 78, 461 S.E.2d 438, rev'g en banc, 19 Va. App. 615, 454 S.E.2d
16 (1995) (construing Virginia Code § 18.2-479(B)).
269. See id. at 81-82, 461 S.E.2d at 439.
270. Id. at 82, 401 S.E.2d at 439; see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App.
102, 462 S.E.2d 125 (1995).
271. Castell, 21 Va. App. at 84-85, 461 S.E.2d at 441 (Benton, J., dissenting). The
dissenters also relied upon sections 19.2-77 and 18.2-479(B) of the Virginia Code, for
the proposition that the legislature in drafting the escape from custody statute in-
tended to equate custody with physical control. Id.
The decision in Castell resulted in there being a different meaning for custody
within the Fourth Amendment context and the statutory context. The en banc
majority's rationale appears to sanction this result:
Mr. X is approached at random, and without suspicion, by the po-
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The General Assembly in 1996 elevated the offense of obstruc-
tion of justice without force to a Class 2 misdemeanor and
thereby rendered that offense jailable.272
In Newton v. Commonwealth,273 the court of appeals held
that a victim's multiple cuts, some of which required treatment
with stitches and one of which was still "'obvious and visible'
and not covered, even by his beard" five months after the event
were sufficient to prove aggravated malicious wounding."
Section 18.2-51.2 of the Virginia Code, the malicious wounding
statute, was amended in 1991 from requiring the victim to be
"'totally and permanently disabled,'" to requiring a showing only
of "'severe[] injur[y] and... permanent and significant physical
impairment.'275
VIII. SENTENCING AND OTHER REMEDIES
If a sentencing court suspends imposition or execution of a
sentence, or a portion thereof, the period of suspension may be
articulated by the sentencing court.276 In the absence of such
lice. The police yell to Mr. X that he is under arrest and attempt to
seize him, but Mr. X escapes their grasp and runs two feet away. Thus
far, for Fourth Amendment purposes, no seizure has taken place. See
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Woodson v. Commonwealth,
245 Va. 401, 429 S.E.2d 27 (1993). At that moment the police close to
within an inch of Mr. X at which time he discards what the police recog-
nize to be contraband. The police yell again to Mr. X that he is under
arrest, but Mr. X continues to run. Mr. X can be prosecuted for both
possession of the contraband, since it was not discovered during an un-
lawful seizure, and for escape since he should have known that the sec-
ond command to stop indicated he was not free to leave.
272. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
273. 21 Va. App. 86, 462 S.E.2d 117 (1995).
274. Id. at 89, 462 S.E.2d at 118.
275. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51.2). The court of
appeals reasoned that "Title 55.1 of the Code, entitled Persons with Disabilities, de-
fines 'physical impairment" as 'any physical condition... or cosmetic disfigurement
which is caused by bodily injury,' and that the victim's injuries in Newton fit that
definition which the legislature presumably knew prior to enactment of the section
18.2-51.2 amendment. Id. at 90, 462 S.E.2d at 119. The court of appeals also held
permissible the fact-finder's inference of the permanency of the victim's injuries based
on their number, the number of stitches required, and the fact that they were visible
five months after the incident causing them. Id. The court of appeals also noted that
appellant apparently conceded the permanence of the injuries at trial. Id. n.1, 462
S.E.2d at 119 n.1.
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-306 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cumn Supp. 1996).
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an expression, the period is presumptively equivalent to the
amount of time the defendant could have been sentenced for
the crime for which he was convicted. 7 In Briggs v. Common-
wealth,"'8 a trial judge initially suspended imposition of sen-
tence, on a charge carrying a maximum of ten years in a state
correctional facility. Almost two years later, the trial judge
timely and permissibly revoked that suspension. That first
revocation resulted in the defendant being sentenced to a term
of ten years, with five years suspended. Twelve years after the
defendant was initially convicted, the trial court revoked the
suspended execution of the remaining sentence. The defendant
complained that the trial court was without jurisdiction to do so
since the second revocation occurred after the expiration of ten
years from the date of his initial conviction. The court of ap-
peals held, however, that the remedial nature of Virginia Code
section 19.2-306, which authorizes the suspended imposition
and execution of sentences, required a broad construction and
that when the first revocation resulted in an imposed sentence,
that triggered the running of a new ten year period in which
the defendant was liable to have his suspended execution of
sentence revoked.279
Bifurcated jury trials for all non-capital felonies, a procedure
established in 1994,80 remained an issue ripe for appellate
review and a hot-bed of judicial and legislative activity. The
twin messages of Riley v. Commonwealth21' and Pierce v.
Commonwealth 2 appear to be that (1) administration of the
bifurcated trial procedure is one left to the discretion of the
trial court and (2) the raison d' etre of a separate sentencing
proceeding is to inject truth into the jury's sentencing inquiry.
In Riley, the court of appeals held that section 19.2-295.1 was
procedural, not substantive in nature and therefore a defendant
whose alleged offense took place before bifurcated jury trials
came about nevertheless properly faced such a trial since that
was the procedure in effect at the time of trial.' In Pierce,
277. Id.
278. 21 Va. App. 338, 464 S.E.2d 512 (1995).
279. Id. at 343-44, 464 S.E.2d at 514.
280. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
281. 21 Va. App. 330, 464 S.E.2d 508 (1995).
282. 21 Va. App. 581, 466 S.E.2d 130 (1996).
283. Riley, 21 Va. App. at 337-38, 464 S.E.2d at 511.
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the court of appeals held that a defendant could permissibly
introduce evidence at the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial
even if the Commonwealth elected not to do so.2 At the sen-
tencing phase of a trial the Commonwealth may permissibly
introduce evidence of the kind of sentences the defendant re-
ceived for prior offenses.' At sentencing, the Commonwealth
may also introduce convictions for offenses committed by the
defendant after the time of the offense for which the defendant
is on trial without violating the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.'
The court of appeals in Daye v. Commonwealth. 7 held that
defendants are not entitled to a so-called "slow guilty plea."
Daye had pled not guilty, but on a finding of guilt by the jury,
sought to withdraw his not guilty plea, amend his plea to
guilty, and thereby avoid jury sentencing. The trial judge re-
fused to accept the withdrawal and the court of appeals af-
firmed that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, made after a
jury returns a verdict of guilty, is not timely.' If fourteen
days notice of the Commonwealth's intention to introduce prior
convictions at sentencing is not provided to the defendant, as
required by section 19.2-295.1, but the prior convictions are ad-
missible at the guilt phase (for example to prove the
defendant's status as a felon in a prosecution for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon), the jury may nonetheless con-
sider the prior offenses at the sentencing phase. 9 If a jury is
unable to agree as to punishment, and if the court, the defen-
dant and the attorney for the Commonwealth all agree, the
court may fix the defendant's punishment"0 Finally, the Com-
monwealth may permissibly have a rebuttal argument at the
sentencing phase."'
284. Pierce, 21 Va. App. at 584-85, 466 S.E.2d at 131-32 (1996). In 1995, the Gen-
eral Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 to reach the same result.
This change was in effect at the time of the decision in Pierce. See VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
285. See Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 465 S.E.2d 592 (1996).
286. Bunn v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 593, 598-99, 466 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1996).
287. 21 Va. App. 688, 467 S.E.2d 287 (1996).
288. Id. at 692-93, 467 S.E.2d at 289.
289. Gilley v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 740, 744, 467 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1996).
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum- Supp. 1996).
291. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 622, 472 S.E.2d 285 (1996).
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In 1995, the first implementation of Virginia's new sentenc-
ing guidelines were adopted to provide uniformity among sen-
tencing courts for felonies, to account for the impact of the 1995
law ending parole, to effect stiffer sentences for many of the
most violent crimes, and to better effect the policy goal of truth
in sentencing. While the new Virginia Criminal Sentencing
Commission, which drafts sentencing guidelines and monitors
their implementation, expected that 1995 statistics would not
fully reflect the efficacy of the new guidelines due to the length
of time required to bring a felony to trial and final disposi-
tion,292 the Commission reported that circuit court judges sen-
tenced offenders in accordance with the recommended guide-
lines in seventy-five percent of cases.29 Of those cases where
judges departed from the guideline recommendation, fifty-eight
percent resulted in sentences higher than the guidelines and
forty-two percent resulted in sentences lower than the guide-
lines. 4 Judges complied with the guidelines in larceny cases
most frequently and in rape cases least frequently.9 '
IX. APPEALS
Satchell v. Commonwealth296 posed a number of interesting
appellate review questions. Satchell first considered the implica-
tions of a Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal, pursuant to
Virginia Code section 19.2-408, on a defendant's subsequent
direct appeal of his conviction.297 The court of appeals held
that the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal, limited in scope,
could have no stare decisis effect on the defendant's subsequent
direct appeal of his conviction since the Commonwealth's ap-
peal, by statute, "shall not preclude a defendant, if he is con-
victed, from requesting the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court
on direct appeal to reconsider an issue which was the subject of
the pretrial appeal."9 ' The effect of the Satchell holding is to
292. 1995 VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 37 (1995).
293. Id. at 41.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 42. Different judicial circuits complied at different rates. The 20th and
7th Circuits complied 88% and 86% of the time respectively. The 29th and 18th Cir-
cuits, by comparison, complied only 56% and 60% of the time. Id. at 52-53.
296. 20 Va. App. 641, 460 S.E.2d 253 (1995) (en banc).
297. Id. at 643, 460 S.E.2d at 254.
298. Id. at 647, 460 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-409 (Repl. Vol.
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render the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal essentially an
advisory opinion since it cannot control the outcome of the
subsequent direct appeal.'
The second appellate review question posed by Satchell is
how to determine the appropriate standard of review. The trial
judge, after the case was reversed and remanded by the court
of appeals, denied Satchells renewed motion to suppress, but
continued to adhere to his earlier factual findings. The appel-
late axiom that evidence on appeal is viewed in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below (here the Common-
wealth) ran afoul in Satchell of the equally well settled axiom
that deference is owed to the fact finder's factual findings. In
resolving this tension, the court of appeals stated, "[u]nder
th[e]se circumstances, we adopt for this case a standard of
review deferential to the trial court's factual findings and con-
fine our inquiry to whether those findings are supported by
credible evidence."00 Although the standard articulated by the
court of appeals proved workable in Satchell, the court might
have spared itself some future confusion by simply stating that,
on appeal, deference is owed to the trial judge's fact findings.
Such a rule is consistent with why ordinarily the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below
since, ordinarily, the factual findings are consistent with the
prevailing party's position."0'
1995)).
299. See also Cherry v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 132, 462 S.E.2d 574 (1995),
for the proposition that stare decisis is not a bar to reconsideration on direct appeal
of an issue previously adjudicated in an interlocutory appeal since, in Cherry, the
parties to the interlocutory appeal were the same as those in the interlocutory appeal
and stare decisis applies only "if the parties are different, though the [issue] be the
same." Id. at 137, 462 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121
Va. 611, 623, 93 S.E. 684, 688 (1917)). The court of appeals stated, in a footnote,
that the Commonwealth had raised neither res judicata nor law of the case as poten-
tial bars to consideration of the same issue on direct appeal. Id. n.3, 462 S.E.2d at
576 n.3. The Cherry court also cited, however, to Satchell for the proposition that "an
appellant is entitled to have the full Court 'reconsider an issue which was the I subject
of a pretrial appeal.'" Id., 462 S.E.2d at 576-77 (citation omitted).
300. Satchell, 20 Va. App. at 648, 460 S.E.2d at 256.
301. Id The question left unanswered by Satchell is the procedural anomaly that
resulted from the court hearing the case en banc prior to any decision from the three
judge panel to which the case was initially referred and before which the case was
initially argued. The en bane majority stated simply: "[T]hinking that the issues con-
cerning the effect of our decision on interlocutory appeals and the review mandate of
Code § 19.2-409 required a prompt full-Court decision, on motion of two members of
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In Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 2 the court of appeals, con-
sistent with past practice, narrowly construed the Common-
wealth's right to an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals
held that since a trial judge's decision to suppress evidence was
based on collateral estoppel, and not on any of the statutorily
enumerated bases giving rise to a potential interlocutory appeal
(which include double jeopardy grounds), the Commonwealth
could not appeal the trial court's suppression of evidence.3"
The court of appeals in James v. Commonwealth3 acknowl-
edged that, in accordance with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in accordance with Ornelas v. United States,"0 5
determinations of warrantless probable cause and reasonable
suspicion shall be reviewed de novo on appeal."°e
the panel, we decided to consider this case en bane." Id. at 643, 460 S.E.2d at 254.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Benton observed:
I also disagree with the process by which this appeal was consid-
ered en bane. Following Satchell's conviction, this appeal followed the
usual procedure. When a panel granted the petition for appeal, the ap-
peal was assigned to a panel of three judges who considered the appeal
on the record after briefing and oral argument. An opinion was prepared
with one judge dissenting. When the opinions were filed in the clerk's of-
fice, the dissenting judge requested that the entire Court reconsider the
appeal en banc. The Court determined to withhold release of the panel's
decision and to consider the appeal anew en banc. I believe that there
are sound jurisprudential reasons to avoid a mechanism that allows a
dissenting judge to initiate an en bane consideration after a panel has
decided a case and before the panel releases its decision.
Although the statutory provisions for hearing a case en bane state
that "the Court may sit en banc... at any time," [VA. CODE ANN.] § 17-
116.02(D), the procedure employed to take this case en bane squandered
scarce judicial resources. More importantly, however, the procedure em-
ployed in this case graphically demonstrates the need for this Court to
set standards for en bane review that are published and available to all
litigants. All members of the Bar should be informed that assignment of
a case to a panel and the panel's consideration of an appeal do not pre-
clude en bane consideration before the panel renders its decision. Al-
though I believe that this process negates the efficiency of the panel
process, I also believe that this Court has an obligation to inform the
Bar of the procedures that it employs to consider cases en banc.
Id. at 650 n.1, 460 S.E.2d at 257-58 n.1 (Benton, J., concurring).
302. 21 Va. App. 745, 467 S.E.2d 813 (1996).
303. Id. at 747, 467 S.E.2d at 814-15.
304. 22 Va. App. 740, 473 S.E.2d 90 (1996).
305. 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
306. James, 27 Va. App. at 743, 473 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at
1663).
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Getting one's appeal heard in Virginia's appellate courts,
much less winning on appeal, remains a daunting proposition.
In 1995, 2,081 petitions for appeal were filed in criminal cases
in the Virginia Court of Appeals." In 1995, the court of ap-
peals granted 350 petitions for appeal and thereby agreed to
hear those cases on their merits.0 8 In 1995, the court of ap-
peals reversed, in some measure, only 118 criminal convic-
tions.3" Even less promising for criminal defendants, in 1995
the Supreme Court of Virginia received 935 criminal petitions,
and in that same calendar year, granted a writ of appeal in
only eight.310
X. CONCLUSION
The criminal law is a body that evolves with great speed and
with great volume. Those facets of its development remain both
its greatest reward and challenge and its greatest curse.
307. Letter from Stephanie W. Vassar, Office Manager, Clerk's Office of the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals, (June 20, 1996) (on file with the author).
308. I&
309. I&
310. Telephone interview with Virginia Supreme Court Clerkls Office (Aug. 23,
1996) (regarding 1995 Virginia Supreme Court Year End statistics).
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